ABSTRACT This article uses hydropower development on the Lancang (upper
4. "China's premier reportedly orders restudy of controversial dam, but officials say they know of no change," Associated Press 7. In an interview, one expert noted that blaming outages on capacity shortage suggests that the solution is to increase capacity. Such a solution directly benefits those with an interest in dams, specifically dam companies and governments awaiting taxes on electricity. 9. E. C. Chapman and Daming He, "Downstream implications of China's dams on the Lancang jiang (upper Mekong) and their potential significance for greater regional Powershed Politics Chinese articles about water allocation, land use, basin planning, legal norms and international co-operation on Lancang-Mekong development, 10 but scholars outside China seem largely to have ignored these publications. Finally, I argue that new spatial configurations -"powersheds" -help legitimize electricity transfers and provide a lens for understanding scalar politics of electricity in a dynamic, processual sense.
This article first provides background on the Western Development campaign, specifically as related to hydropower. It then describes the projects on the Lancang and Nu rivers, two international rivers in Yunnan expected to play a fundamental role in fulfilling the campaign's energy goals. The article then outlines the industrial reforms and institutional dynamics most relevant to understanding Yunnan's hydropower development. The conclusion argues that these "western" projects are a fundamental component of development in eastern China, and that understanding issues such as urban development, globalization and enterprise reform in eastern, "modern" and urban China requires a dynamic, multi-scalar approach that recognizes the role played by energy projects in western, "backward" and rural China.
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Politics of Scale in Western Development
The Western Development campaign, officially launched in 1999, has become the centrepiece of China's Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Many components, however, have a much longer lineage. Send Western Electricity East (xi dian dong song), for instance, was first promulgated in the 1980s as a way of tapping hydropower potential on Yunnan's Yuan River. 12 The first project was implemented in June 1993 by the Yunnan Electric Power Group Company (Yunnan diali jituan gongsi), when it began seasonal transmission of electricity from Yunnan to Guangdong. 10. See Feng Yan and He Daming, "Guoji shuifa de fazhan qushi yu Zhongguo shuifa tixi de duibi fenxi yanjiu" ("A comparative study on the developing tendencies of international water law and Chinese water law system"), Dili xuebao (Acta Geographica Sinica), Vol. 54 (Supplement) (1999), pp. 165-172; Daming He, Changming Liu and Zhifeng Yang, "Zhongguo guoji heliu kechixu fazhan yanjiu" ("Study for the sustainability of international rivers in China"), Dili xuebao, Vol. 54 (Supplement) (1999), pp. 1-10; He Daming, Yang Ming and Feng Yan, "Xi'nan guoji heliu shuiziyuan de heli liyong yu guoji hezuo yanjiu" ("Study on reasonable utilization of water resources in international rivers and international region co-operation in south-west China"), Dili xuebao, Vol. 54 (Supplement) (1999), pp. 29-37. Other articles in the same issue address issues of development on China's transnational rivers.
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Other policies under the rubric of western development, some in existence since the early 1980s, signal an institutionalization of resource transfer patterns and underscore the importance of geographic scalar configurations in legitimizing such transfers.
14 China's west is constructed as resource-rich yet economically (and often culturally) backward, and electricity transfer schemes are trumpeted as key to relieving eastern electrical shortages and providing rural electrification and poverty alleviation near the dams. Similarly, Yunnan is framed as an electricity provider in the ADB's Greater Mekong Subregion, evidenced by the emphasis on regional grid construction at the Second GMS Summit in July 2005 in Kunming. In summer 2001, a delegation from Guangdong visited south-western provinces with the purpose of establishing electricity transfer agreements. The mission succeeded: Yunnan and Guizhou agreed to provide 4 million and 1.6 million kWh, respectively. 15 Several scholars have argued that Western Development adds legitimacy and urgency to resource transfer schemes that date to the height of central planning, and can be seen as a type of internal colonization in which the key beneficiaries are hydropower companies and eastern provinces set to receive cheaper electricity. 16 Others insist that adequate measures be taken to ensure the campaign does not inadvertently reinforce those regional differentials it ostensibly seeks to correct. 17 The notion of a powershed provides a useful analytical framework for capturing the complexity of China's interprovincial power dynamics. I use the term in a way somewhat analogous to a watershed, 18 in that it represents a space over which a portable resource (water or electricity) is collected and concentrated for use, with use frequently occurring far from the site of collection (or in the case of electricity, generation). The term simultaneously encourages an analysis of political economic power over space, including through more Foucaultian means based on discourses of (under)development, livelihood improvement and energy security, as well as through policy and fiscal pressures. Understanding the exercise of power over space is a fundamentally geographic task. A particularly important point here is that the spatial framework put forward is not confined by traditional political demarcations, but rather a hybrid incorporating bio-geophysical and political realities. Powershed Politics Figure 1 shows trends in urban electricity consumption over the past decade for Kunming and three industrial centres in Guangdong. Units are in terawatt-hours (1 TWh ϭ 1 billion kilowatt-hours). Figure 2 shows Yunnan's annual hydroelectric generation capacity in a national context. Consumption is generally measured in terms of power-time (kilowatthour or terawatt-hour); installed capacity is measured in terms of power (kilowatt or megawatt).
Controversial Cascades
Yunnan's hydropower potential is significant, and it is easy to understand interest in hastening its development. According to one publication, yearly theoretical hydropower potential stands at more than 900 billion kWh, or 15.3 per cent of China's total. Actual exploitable yearly generating potential is estimated to be significantly lower at almost 400 billion kWh, 20.5 per cent of China's total. 19 Since the break-up of the Ministry of Electric Power in 1998 and subsequent break-up of its successor, China State Power Corporation, 20 in 2002 into five companies, the offspring companies have staked claims on major rivers in Yunnan and throughout China in order to develop large hydropower stations.
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Hydropower development on the Lancang-Mekong. The Lancang begins its 4,800-kilometre journey to the South China Sea at 5,500 m on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau (Qing-Zang gaoyuan), dropping 5,000 m by the 22 As it flows through Yunnan the river loses 1,780 m in elevation, 23 yielding a theoretical hydroelectric potential of 25,000 MW. 24 As a comparison, the Three Gorges dam will have an installed capacity of 18,200 MW. Leaving Yunnan after 1,227 km, 25 the Mekong (as it is known outside Yunnan) forms the border between Myanmar and China, then flows through Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam before emptying into the sea. The Lancang-Mekong ranks among the world's most important rivers according to various criteria: watershed population, sediment discharge, flow volume, channel length and fisheries richness, to name a few. The drainage area, some 810,000 km 2 , is home to over 60 million people, many of whom depend on the river for their livelihoods. The Lancang's annual hydropower generating capacity within Yunnan is estimated to be more than 100 TWh, slightly more than that of Laos, and between two and 20 times more than that of the other four Mekong countries. 26 For comparison, 80 TWh per year would be enough to power Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dongguan and Kunming combined.
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While the Chinese government has only relatively recently (since the early 1980s) solidified plans for the Lancang, 28 the first surveys were begun in the 1950s. 29 Plans for development on the lower Mekong date to the Mekong Consultative Committee for Co-ordinated Development, established by the United States and UN in 1957. The committee carried out numerous surveys in the late 1950s, but no plans were implemented because of the political upheaval that destabilized the region for the second half of the 20th century, leading to Cambodia's withdrawal from the committee for nearly 20 years. Cambodia reapplied for admission in 1991, and after a period of restructuring, the committee was re-established as the Mekong River Commission in 1995 with four members: Cambodia, Thailand, Lao PDR and Vietnam. Much has been written about the strengths and failures of the commission. 
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Work on the first dam on the main channel of the Lancang-Mekong, the Manwan, began in 1985. The first turbine came online in 1992, the final one in 1995. The dam, on the border of Simao and Lincang, was financed through a partnership between the (then) Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power and the Yunnan government, the first such arrangement.
31 The "Manwan model" is cited as one example of the creativity of officials and enterprise leaders in financing large-scale hydropower. Following Manwan, other projects proceeded apace, benefiting from a favourable policy environment and a river-wide development monopoly. Ground was broken on Dachaoshan in 1997. The first turbine came online in 2001, with all six functioning by October 2003. Dachaoshan was hailed as providing much-needed relief to the strained electrical grid in Yunnan and making an important contribution to regional power production. 32 As with Manwan, the financing and institutional arrangements of Dachaoshan were credited as groundbreaking.
The third and fourth Lancang dams are under construction. Work on Xiaowan, in Dali Bai Nationality Autonomous Prefecture upstream of Dachaoshan and Manwan, began in January 2002. 33 Described as a symbol of Yunnan's realization of western development, it will be the highest arch dam in the world at 292 m, with a reservoir of 15.132 billion m 3 . 34 Apart from generating electricity, Xiaowan's other purpose is to regulate flows downstream. According to the chief engineer of the development company, regulation reduces the difference between rainyand dry-season flows and will "help with irrigation and navigation in the lower reaches" and improve flood diversion work downstream. 35 Regularized flows will also guarantee the ability of downstream dams to generate electricity in times of peak demand. 36 The fourth Lancang 36. According to engineers at Yunnan Electric Power Company, Xiaowan's ability to harmonize seasonal flows will increase the efficiency (generation per unit of water) of Manwan and Dachaoshan to 98% and 95% respectively. See Yang Xiangze, "Cong dianli shichang kan Xiaowan dianzhan jianshe de biyaoxing" ("An electricity market perspective on the necessity of constructing Xiaowan Hydropower Station"), Yunnan shuili fadian, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1998), pp. 11-14. See also "Lanchang (sic) river blocked for power project," Xinhua News Agency, 10 November 1997. Powershed Politics project, Jinghong, lies four kilometres north of the capital of Xishuangbanna Dai Nationality Autonomous Prefecture. Jinghong was originally a joint project involving majority investment from the Energy Generating Authority of Thailand, whereby all power generated for the first two years would be transmitted to northern Thailand. 37 The project is now being built without Thai funding as a result of a speedier timeline than originally specified and decreased projections in Thai electrical demand. Now, as with the other three dams described above, the power generated will be transmitted to Guangdong by 500-kV high-voltage lines that will eventually connect to the Southern China Power Grid (Zhongguo nanfang dianwang) . 38 According to one company representative, despite having pulled out of Jinghong, Thai authorities have committed to jointly developing Nuozhadu. The first agreement was made before the Jinghong arrangement was cancelled, and called for a three-way division of the proposed 5,500 MW capacity of Nuozhadu: 3,000 MW for Guangdong, 1,500 MW for Thailand and 1,000 MW for Yunnan.
39 Table 2 provides information about the Lancang cascade, with dams listed from north to south. The plan described here calls for eight dams, with Xiaowan and Nuozhadu having significant reservoirs. A more ambitious plan called for 14 dams, including six on the river's upper stretch. 40 It seems unlikely the upstream six will be built, however, due to limited infrastructure and uncertainty about electricity demand. A meeting to discuss the draft environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the eight projects was held in Kunming in November 2004 involving company representatives, government officials, scientists and engineers. 41 Cancelling the southernmost two dams, Ganlanba and Mengsong, in order to minimize trans-border impacts was suggested in the mid-1990s and broached again in the meeting. The draft EIA was not approved, and while this will probably have little impact on Xiaowan, Jinghong and Nuozhadu, the fate of the other dams remains unclear. One factor is likely to be the role of the last two dams in flow re-regulation, to counteract daily flow changes caused by upstream dams. This would reduce fluctuations in downstream flows, possibly easing ecological and social impacts. Much like Three Gorges, the Lancang projects have been criticized for disorganized resettlement of residents near the dams. 42 For Manwan, promises of affordable electricity to local communities have not been kept, a result evidently of the high cost of infrastructure necessary to connect high-voltage output from power stations to lower-voltage local grids. 43 Additionally, resettled residents complain that promises of compensation have been broken, even though the Manwan dam has been functioning since 1993. Nu River hydropower plans are a relatively recent phenomenon, primarily because of poor infrastructure in the area. Hydropower companies, local officials and other supporters tout hydropower as a tool for poverty alleviation, criticizing opponents as urbanites opposing dams on aesthetic grounds while ignoring villagers' poverty. 49 During a visit by Provincial People's Consultative Committee representatives in October 2004, prefecture officials claimed the projects were necessary to help alleviate poverty in an area with few other options. 50 Indeed, "to build or not to build" has become the key question. One newspaper, citing the variety of voices in the debate (scientists, engineers, citizen groups and local government), suggested that the projects have become a symbol of the challenges in balancing development and ecological protection. 
How the Waters Were Divided
This section details electrical industry reforms from the late 1990s to the present, focusing on aspects most relevant to understanding Yunnan hydropower. The goal is both to complicate and to clarify the institutional linkages and decision-making dynamics among local, provincial and national government entities and hydropower companies. This brief exploration of the institutional landscape of Yunnan hydropower, which should be understood in the larger context outlined by other scholars, 52 illustrates the challenges industry restructuring presents to governmental norms in China and to those seeking to understand the changing relationship between industry and government.
As a first step in corporatizing 53 the electric power industry, the State Council authorized the Ministry of Electric Power to reorganize into the State Power Corporation of China (Zhongguo guojia dianli gongsi, SPCC) in December 1996. 54 All investment came from the State Council, 55 and the ministry was disbanded in March 1998. Two goals of corporatization were to separate generation from distribution and to modernize management of the industry. This, in theory, would realign company priorities in terms of profit and market rather than political incentives. Yet as one author noted, "changing direct government ownership into ownership by public corporations is as much a matter of government reform as enterprise restructuring." 56 Another pointed out the importance of understanding the extent of various parties' participation in decision-making, including national governments, development banks, other international investors and donors, and non-government organizations. 57 Absent from this list, however, are sub-national governments and hydropower companies.
A second wave of reforms came in late 2002 when the SPCC was broken into five power generation corporations, each a stock company in which the central government (through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) retained majority stake: China Guodian Corporation (Zhongguo guodian jituan gongsi), China Huadian Corporation (Zhongguo huadian jituan gongsi), China Huaneng Group (Zhongguo huaneng jituan gongsi), China Power Investment Corporation (Zhongguo dianli touzi jituan gongsi) and China Datang Corporation (Zhongguo datang jituan gongsi) . 58 Each was given development rights on major watersheds by the State Council in a process that critics who perceive dam development as disorganized, near-sighted and underregulated describe as "riding a horse to encircle the waters" (paoma quanshui). 59 A sixth company, China Three Gorges Project Corporation (Zhongguo Chang jiang sanxia gongcheng kaifa gongsi), 60 exists parallel to these five but directly under the State Council. Huadian and Huaneng are particularly relevant to this article. Huadian holds development rights on the Nu through its subsidiary Yunnan Huadian Nujiang Hydropower Development Company, 61 while Huaneng holds rights on the Lancang through its subsidiary, Yunnan Huaneng Lancang River Hydropower Company (Yunnan huaneng Lancang jiang shuidian youxian gongsi, also known as Hydrolancang). 62 Both have subsidiaries listed on the Hong Kong, Shanghai and New York stock exchanges. Yunnan hydropower development has involved several innovations in financing and institutional structuring, and merits closer examination here.
The Manwan hydropower station, the first dam on the main channel of the Lancang-Mekong, was initially a project of the Yunnan government and (then) Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power. The project was launched in 1986 and completed in 1995. 63 The ministry-province Powershed Politics partnership was reorganized into a stock company, omic, technical and social) of the project. If the provincial commission and committees deem the proposal feasible, the commission grants the company the right to escalate the proposal to the NDRC. Following approval at this stage, the company is allowed to proceed with a project application, submitted again to the NDRC, and upon approval may proceed with preliminary work. If the projects are particularly large 74 or situated on an international river, further approval from the State Council or the National People's Congress is required.
Technical and "internal" issues such as feasibility and profitability are generally evaluated at the provincial level, while "external" issues such as environmental and social impacts are considered at the central level. According to one company representative, the responsibilities of central government fall under six categories: protecting national economic security; guaranteeing rational resource development; protecting the ecological environment; conforming to national economic development principles; guaranteeing public benefit; and preventing monopolies and unhealthy competition. In cases where the impacts of a project are deemed particularly significant, the NDRC can require a hearing for further consultation. A recent example of this type of intensified review is a list published on 18 January 2005 by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) of 30 projects in 13 provinces and regions which were ordered to be 74. The criteria for "large" are unclear.
suspended for beginning work before EIA approval. 75 This is the first time China's EIA law has been used to suspend projects already under way and the first time such a list has been publicized. The order met with resistance, 76 and while the projects were eventually restarted, this nevertheless represents an increase in the "teeth" of the SEPA.
Conclusion: Processes, Powersheds and Multi-scalar Analysis
In a 2004 article, David Goodman noted the importance of sub-provincial analysis for understanding the dynamics and impacts of the Open Up the West campaign. 77 He suggested that the apparently simple goals of the campaign -to ensure greater equality, increase state capacity and assist in nation-building -are actually complex and imprecise due to the complexity of decision-making in China. Both scholars and policy makers must question assertions that western China development based on resource exports to eastern China will reduce regional disparities. This article has underscored the importance of an inter-provincial perspective for understanding the impact and implementation of western development, specifically in terms of decision-making. In particular, the article has demonstrated the importance of two factors.
First, it is essential to understand the role played by energy enterprises in China in project implementation. These enterprises retain various degrees of political motivations, and their role as influential third parties in decision-making processes often assumed to be bilateral (that is, central and local governments) must not be overlooked. As shown in the above analysis of Lancang hydropower, institutional dynamics and enterprise-government relations are vastly complex, with many entities involved in planning, approval, finance, construction, operation and management. Additionally, given Yunnan's proximity to mainland Southeast Asia's electricity export market, Yunnan hydropower may have different outcomes from those noted by Tim Oakes in Guizhou. At the very least, the role of Huaneng, Huadian and the Yunnan Development and Reform Commission in promoting mega-projects merits further exploration, particularly with regard to Oakes' assertion that restructuring "doesn't really constitute a significant change in the state's relationship to the power sector." 78 Picking apart the monolithic "party-state apparatus" Powershed Politics is not simply an exercise in academic deconstruction; it stands to elucidate important dynamics such as competition between Huaneng and Huadian to get mega-projects approved in an environment of increasing scrutiny by state and quasi-state actors and concerns about looming electrical capacity surpluses. In addition, understanding the dynamics of Yunnan hydropower, whether from the perspective of its impact on the stated goals of western development or from an international perspective stressing co-operative development on international rivers, requires attention not only to interactions between actors in Yunnan and Beijing but also to the triangular relationship among Beijing, Guangdong and Yunnan. More research is needed concerning the role Guangdong-based actors play in negotiating energy transfer arrangements that are vitally important to relieving energy shortages threatening Guangdong's economic dynamism.
Secondly, this article has demonstrated the importance of considering geographic scale in a dynamic, relational and constructed sense. Many geographers have pushed for an understanding of scale that transcends the obvious meanings of map scale and analytical frame. Indeed, the notion of a politics of scale rests on the idea that different geographic configurations and their boundaries embody and enable certain power relations while restricting others. Thus a logic that is more than Cartesian motivates locating Yunnan in China's "west," thereby enabling and justifying certain government policies. Another motivates the naming of Yunnan as part of the ADB's Greater Mekong Subregion, legitimizing discourses of regional power grid development in which Yunnan will play a key role. Focusing on processes rather than a priori analytic containers makes it easier to capture this dynamic. Just as studying erosion in the Mekong delta requires attention to hydrologic and socioeconomic processes throughout the entire Lancang-Mekong watershed, so does understanding economic development in Guangdong necessitate consideration of one of the primary driving forces behind that development, namely electricity provision. Processes related to Guangdong's quest to procure reliable energy, including inter-governmental negotiation, inter-firm agreements, financing and operation arrangements, all suggest an analytical framework, which I call a powershed, that transcends and intersects numerous more apparent analytical "boxes." Mapping such powersheds, both in terms of institutional interrelations and linkages through which capital and influence flow, as well as the physical linkages through which electricity flows, will improve current understandings of China's reforms, and of policies such as the Western Development campaign.
